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NON-PATERNITY TESTS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS.

Unnecessary confusion exists concerning the relation of medicine to law because of the common failure to distinguish between
law, legal medicine and medical jurisprudence. This is clearly evident as illustrated by the publications on the subject of non-paternity 1
appearing in this LAW REVIEW. 2 Medical jurisprudence deals with
the statutory and common law affecting medical licensing, practice
and malpractice. Legal medicine is expert medical knowledge applied to the needs of law. 3 The technic and investigative results of
legal medicine are eminently the problems of medical experts and
can properly touch the law only as matter for judicial notice or as
questions of fact. To define law is difficult; it seems that law is the
plastic mold for civilized human conduct that responds to the internal
pressure of the thing it seeks to shape and regulate. The law, in
formulated rules of evidence, deals pre-eminently with probabilities
and human experience. 4 It is from this point of departure that a
sound, legal view of non-paternity tests may be approached.
The recent case of Beuschel v. Manowitz 5 involved the question
of non-paternity tests, and Judge Steinbrink held that the defendant
was properly entitled to an order requiring the plaintiff and her child
to submit to blood tests, under Civil Practice Act, Section 306, the
examination sought being relevant on the issue of paternity. The
'Since iso-agglutination tests are of negative force, it is appropriate to
speak of non-paternity rather than paternity tests; they are employed to
exclude, not to prove, paternity. Infra notes 12, 14, 19.

'Mr. Schroeder in (1933) 7 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 253, divided his article
into sections dealing respectively with legal medicine and law. Dr. Wiener in
(1933) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. Rsv. 70, discusses the subject as legal medicine. Dr.
Schumacher in (1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 276, deals with the law on the
problem.
'Schultz, Present Status and Future Development of Legal Medicine in
the United States (1933) 15 ARCHIVES OF PATH. 542, at 543.
'"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed." HOLMES, THE
CommoN LAW (1881) 1.
'151 Misc. 899 (1934).
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Appellate Division 6 unanimously reversed the decision of the lower
court, both on the law and the facts.
The judicial process whereby the Appellate Division arrived at
the decision to exclude non-paternity tests by indirection is obscured
by an ambiguous memorandum. There are cogent and practical
reasons for resolving this memorandum into its component parts. A
variety of arguments have been offered against the 7acceptance of
non-paternity tests as competent and relevant evidence.
It has been assumed that the test is inadequate, limited in accuracy, and the subject of fundamental controversy among scientists.8
The impression gained from such a statement, namely, that the
evaluation of the test is a mere inference on the part of an expert,
leads to the conclusion that the inference of non-paternity, based
upon an antecedent inference, is too remote to justify acceptance. 9
Primarily, the solution of scientific problems is the province of the
scientist and not of the lawyer; 10 herein lies the confounding of
law and legal nwedicine. It is erroneous to assume that the nonpaternity test is the subject of fundamental scientific controversy.
National and international authorities in science are in agreement as
to the technic, interpretation and application of the procedure. 1 The
expert in stating the result of his test is delivering a scientific, factual
proposition to the court; from this he derives his opinion in the
particular case at bar. The original link in the chain is factual and
not an inference in the legal sense. Hence, the argument against
admission of such evidence, as inference based on inference, expires.
0 The memorandum reads in part: "Plaintiff may submit or not to the
taking of her own blood but it plainly determines nothing. She asserts, and
no one would gainsay it, that she is the mother of this child." 241 App. Div.
888 (2d Dept. 1934). Motion for rearguinwt denied; motion for leave to
appeal denied. 242 App. Div. 649 (2d Dept. 1934). It has been held, Drummond v. Dolan, 155 App. Div. 449, 140 N. Y. Supp. 307 (2d Dept. 1913) that
the proof in bastardy proceedings should be entirely satisfactory, and where
the case is decided against the defendant, a sedulous scrutiny of the record by
the appellate court is indicated; an order of filiation made by a divided court
should be vacated and a new trial granted. Judge Jenks said: "Moreover, the
charge is so easy to make and so hard to defend that there should be a sedulous
scrutiny of the record." Flores v. State, 72 Fla. 302, 73 So. 234 (1916) holds
that frailty of evidence is no bar to its admission in a bastardy proceeding.
The above citations, of course, deal with bastardy and not civil proceedings,
but the underlying principle in determining paternity remains the same.
""New concepts must beat down the crystallized resistance of the legally
trained mind that always seeks precedent before the new is accepted into law."
Supra note 5, at 900. "The same arguments which might be advanced against
the test here sought have, from time immemorial, been urged whenever a step
has been taken which marked progress; but the law is not static." Id. at 901.
Schroeder, supra note 2, at 286.
Babcock v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 140 N. Y. 308, 35 N. E. 596 (1893);
People
v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 70, 102 N. E. 546 (1913).
10
Wiener, supra note 2, at 70.
1 There is no living authority of repute who may be cited adversely. The
acceptance of the fundamental discovery of Landsteiner has been universal;
there is still debate and controversy concerning recent advances in the same
field and their application as refinements.
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The objection has been raised that the test is of negative force
and application. 12 There is universal accord among scientists that
such is indeed the case: the test operates in the negative. This should
be no bar to the acceptance of the procedure in law; the admission
of alibi evidence is of similar negative character and not susceptible
of the same probative evaluation as the non-paternity test.' 3 The
Anglo-Saxon mind prefers direct and positive evidence; however,
it does not hesitate to accept the negative proof of alibi. The conclusive character of such negative evidence in the matter under discussion has led Dr. Dyke, in a recent British publication,' 4 to say:
"I need lay no stress upon the importance of being able even
in a limited number of cases to demonstrate non-paternity."
It must be understood that the court's refusal to admit the application of evidence that is universally accepted by scientific authority deprives the defendant of his soundest chance of establishing
his innocence.' 5 Especially in bastardy proceedings is this true. Such
The Appellate Division memorandum says: "A blood test of the defendant and the child [and mother] may possibly determine his non-paternity, but
it is not claimed, as we understand the record, that such a blood test would
determine the defendant's paternity." Supra note 6. See also, Heise, Some
Medicolegal Aspects of Iso-agglutinins (1934) 4 Am. JR. OF CLIN. PATH. 400.
' "Thus an innocent man stands a chance to provd non-paternity by blood
tests which vary from one to two to one to seventeen. On the average, in
advance of knowledge of his blood group, his chance of absolutely exonerating
himself is one to seven. Should it be found that his blood group is that of the
father of the child, his case should not be considered unduly prejudiced unless
all other possible fathers are also tested and eliminated save he. Of course, if
the father is shown to belong to the rare group AB and he [the defendant]
happens to belong to that group a certain shadow of suspicion falls on him.
Should the tests show that his blood group is an entirely impossible one for
paternity in the particular case in point, he has of course established a satisfactory alibi." Parr, The Solution of Medicolegal Problems by Blood Grouping Tests (1932) 1 JR. M. A. ALABAMA 429, at 433.
' The Human Blood Groups (1933) 1 MEDICO-LEGAL & CRIm. REV. 99.
In the discussion, Sir Bernard Spilsbury, at 114, said: "Taking paternity, it is
easy to say in certain cases, that a certain person cannot have been the father
of the child in question; but it is difficult to assert that such a person is the
father of the child; you cannot say more than that he possibly may be. Therefore it is important to make our Courts appreciate the problem from that
point of view, so as to enable this test to be established for medico-legal
application. It can do nothing more than prove the innocence of a person; it
cannot prove guilt. If we make that problem clear, the application of this
test may be accepted more readily by our Courts than it is at the present time."
"Particularly should this be considered since the standard of proof established for bastardy proceedings is neither criminal nor civil, neither flesh nor
fish, but an arbitrary hybrid. The criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is purely qualitative in nature; the civil analogue of proof by a
preponderance is purely quantitative. The standard of "entirely satisfactory
proof" in bastardy proceedings is indefinite, indefinable and arbitrary. Supra
note 6.
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proceedings are quasi-criminal in this jurisdiction; 16 with the tender
regard the law has for the defendant in criminal actions (permitting
reputation evidence 17 that is excluded under analogous situations in
any evidence bearcivil cases), it seems illogical and harsh to exclude
8
ing on innocence in quasi-criminal actions.1
It has been urged that an insufficient number of cases of proof
of non-paternity by blood tests exists. 19 In law, and likewise in legal
medicine, it may be said that proof is not convincing in proportion
to the number of witnesses, but depends essentially on the nature
and quality of the testimony offered. The gist of the matter is qualitative rather than quantitative. 20 Yet, it is true that Schiff had collected 5,584 cases from Teutonic and Scandinavian jurisdictions alone,
thousands added from the
five years ago; there have since been many
21
same and other foreign jurisdictions.
" People v. Colgrove, 63 Hun 635, 18 N. Y. Supp. 370 (General-Term,
5th Dept. 1892); Simis v. Alwang, 48 App. Div. 529, 62 N. Y. Supp. 1067
(2d Dept. 1900).
17 In filiation proceedings good character is admissible in evidence.
Webb
v. Hill, 115 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1909).
"'And it is highly probable that some innocent young men have been
forced into marriage with a woman for whom there is no real affection, into
parenthood of a child to which they are not related, and into check or ruin of
a promising career, in ignorance of the fact that there was a chance, sometimes
a good one, of proving non-paternity." Duhig, Blood Grouping in Proof of
Paternity (1933) 24 MED. JR. AUSTRALIA 545. See also, Heise, mtpra note 12,
at 400: "Therefore, assuming the same distribution of guilt and innocence in
European and American groups, we must conclude that one half the defendants
in fornication and bastardy cases are falsely accused of at least half. of the
charge. Also since accusations of bastardy are usually impossible to disprove
by the methods now in use in this country, convictions are almost certain to
follow, or if the cases are settled out of court in order to avoid scandal, a
legalized form of blackmail is possible."
"A fundamental scientific fact proved once may be reproved but gains
nothing in accuracy or truth. The heredity of blood groups was announced
by Epstein and Ottenberg in (1908) 8 PROC. N. Y. PATH. Soc. 187; it has
been confirmed many thousands of times. See LArs, INDIVIDUALITY OF THE
BLOOD (1932). There is no claim that non-paternity tests seek to usurp the
functions of the court. The German postulate of proof of obvious impossibility of paternity cannot be met by any scientific or legal machinery devised
by man and would lead to invariable conviction if strictly applied. To hold a
man to a standard of proof more stringent than the harshest rules of common
law contract holdings imposed is unreasonable.
' The defendant should be accorded the advantage of the possibility of
innocence granted in criminal cases, to balance the quasi-presumption of
paternity which circumstances and the difficuly of proof to the contrary force
upon him. "By an arbitrary rule, to preclude a party from adducing evidence
which, if received, would compel a decision in his favor, is an act which can
only be justified by the clearest expediency and soundest policy; and it must
be confessed that there are several presumptions still retained in this class
which never ought to have found their Way into it, and which, it is to be feared,
often operate seriously to the defeat of justice." BEST, PREsuipTiONs OF
LAW AND FACT (1844) §18.
Lattes, supra
21 SCHIFF, BLOOD GROUPS AND THEIR APPLICATION (1933);
note 19.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Objection has been offered that the non-paternity test and its
interpretation is not sufficiently obvious 22 for judicial consideration.
The legal fraternity, without special and authoritative knowledge,
seems to insist upon evaluating the intrinsic phenomena of nonpaternity tests. It is said that this is done to preserve the norm as
encountered in the mind of the average juror. This calls for the
observation that the phenomena and argot of science are unintelligible to the untrained or misinformed. It is, perhaps, as necessary
to assume in science that everyone apprehends the significance of
natural phenomena as it is to presume in jurisprudence that everyone
knows the law. The pragmatic application of these doctrines, in
either case, leaves something to be desired; 23 but it is no more
unreasonable to assume that the intelligent lawyer has a nascent appreciation of the phenomena of science than it is to make it conclusive on the scientist that he knows the law. The heredity of blood
groups and the application thereof is as obvious to the scientist as
is the rule against perpetuities and the application thereof to the
lawyer; that some of each class do not apprehend the respective subjects with desired clarity of vision, and, that such esoteric wisdom is
not obvious to members of the opposite profession is merely evidence
of the woeful ignorance under which humanity labors.2 4 It is more
than likely that the average juror understands neither learning, but
is competent to pass upon the ultimate facts. But, wilful interpretation of the rule against perpetuities by a scientist, without special
knowledge thereof, borders on the absurd; the attitude of many
lawyers toward the evaluation of the heredity of blood groups is not
far removed. The physical manifestation of a non-paternity test as
a corporeal characteristic is as obvious to a scientist as an external
body wound; and as between the two, an expert opinion, expressed
with mathematical accuracy, is by far the more obvious on the side
of the non-paternity test. The acceptance of the heredity of blood
groups has become tradition and habit in the international community
of science. Mr. Justice Holmes has said: 25 "Tradition and the
The word, obvious, is shaded by a variability of individual reception of
facts and capability of drawing conclusions that is as arbitrary and whimsical
as an "entirely satisfactory" standard of proof.
"My experience as a judge in other fields of law has made me distrustful
of rules of thumb generally. They are a lazy man's expedient for ridding
himself of the trouble of thinking and deciding." CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE

(1931) 92.

"More and more we lawyers are awaking to a perception of the truth
that what divides and distracts us in the solution of a legal problem is not so
much the uncertainty about the law as uncertainty about the facts-the facts
which generate the law. Let the facts be known as they are, and the law will
sprout from the seed and turn its branches toward the light. We make our
blunders from time to time as rumor has it you make your own. The worst
of them would have been escaped if the facts had been disclosed to us before
the ruling was declared." Cardozo, id. at 75.
'Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 30 Sup. Ct. 301
(1910).
2
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habits of the community count for more than logic." But, science
has in addition the proof necessary
to convince the mind in logical
26
as well as in traditional manner.
In the process of clearing away the underbrush to reach the
path of the law in this problem, it may be emphasized again that the
attitude of the legal fraternity in trespassing upon the domain of
legal medicine seems antagonistic and perverse rather than helpful
in fostering the growth of the law and furthering the ends of justice.
Laymen are acquainted with the prominent advances of medical science through journals published in popular vein from authoritative
sources. 27 To be rebuffed on the threshold of the law is the situation of the informed citizen of this jurisdiction, perhaps wrongly
accused of paternity in a bastardy proceeding or action for civil
assault. The life of the law is experience, according to Mr. Justice
Holmes. 28 The law should
profit by the experience of trained ob29
servers in special fields.

Narrowing the discussion to the jural aspects of the problem,
there seems to be no logical or legal ground for excluding such evidence or denying a court the power to order such evidence obtained
in civil and criminal proceedings; and this is true and arguable even
from the limited view of procedure.
The assertion is often made that examination of the person of
a litigant, in particular the plaintiff, in regard to corporeal manifestations was not permitted at common law. This is true only in the
sense of a vague generality; exceptions of several forms existed. 30
Of particular moment are the common law precedents, if such there
must be, 3 ' in relation to the determination of paternity. We may
indulge in the fiction that the child, for legal purposes, is without a
father until the law settles the question; the mother is bringing suit
' United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272, 54 Sup. Ct. 389
(1934) where Mr. Justice Sutherland said: "It was not until a comparatively
recent period, therefore, that the effect of such an operation [pan-hysterectomy]
was disclosed to observation, and the incontrovertible fact recognized that a
woman
subjected
thereto was permanently incapable of bearing children."
7 (1932)
10 HYGEIA
981, where Calvin Goddard said in regard to nonpaternity tests: "Here again, there is but a certain percentage of cases in
which the tests yield positive conclusions, but this is nevertheless a welcome
advance over the days when there was no certain test applicable in any
such case."
'Supra note 4.
2'Duhig, mtpra note 18, at 546: "Since a person inherits his blood groups
in both systems for life, we have in them a fixed, unalterable character, and
moreover the scheme of inheritance is no longer a matter of conjecture, but of
certainty. The time is therefore well due for making investigations of this
kind in affiliation cases an obligatory part of our legal system. I think that
judges and magistrates who neglect to order tests of the kind indicated, run
the risk of inflicting grave and lifelong injustice."
' See Notes (1891) 14 L: R. A. 466; see also infra notes 31 and 35.
' "The silence of common law authorities upon the question in cases of
this kind proves little or nothing." Mr. Justice Brewer dissenting in Union
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S.250, 11 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1890).
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not only for her benefit but also for that of the child; the sovereign
,power, in bastardy proceedings, brings action not only to benefit the
public and the particular mother, but also the child; the child, therefore, is a proper party before a court, especially in civil actions in
jurisdictions where law and equity have been merged.
Among the significant common law precedents, we have Annesley
v. Anglesea 32 from venerable antiquity (1743) which holds that it
may be shown that a child bears no resemblance to the purported
father. In the Douglas Peerage case 33 (1769), Lord Mansfield allowed the admission of evidence of likeness and dissimilarity. Evidence of dissimilarity in racial characteristics was permitted in the
New York case of Almshouse Comnissioners v. Whistelo.3 4 Evidence of hereditary characteristics and corporeal peculiarities is permissible and should be demonstrated to the jury, is the holding in
Piercy's Peerage case.35 Evidence is admissible of special traits in
which a child resembles the putative father and family; and the
child may then be introduced to enable the jury to pass upon the
alleged resemblances, holds the court in Utah v. Anderson.36
The common law, therefore, contains respectable, authoritative
precedent for the demonstration of similar and dissimilar physical
traits and hereditary peculiarities in the determination of paternity.
The hereditary character of blood groups provides a peculiar physical trait as obvious as polydactylism.37 Competent expert testimony
and facts are for the jury to pass upon; the arbitrary withholding
of such facts and opinion testimony in regard thereto may suffer
great injustice to be done.38 Nor can it be properly said, on the statis' 17 How. ST. TR. 1139 (1743). Of historic interest are the researches
of Schiff, (1929) 55 DEUTSCH. MED. WCHNSCHR. 1141, with reference to
determination of descent in antiquity. He points out that the courts, despite
modern science, still tend to adhere to the view expressed by Paulina in Shakespeare's Winter's Tale, Act II, Scene 3. More startling by analogy is his
quotation of Prof. Hiibotter's translation from Hsi Yuan Lu: "If the remains
of father and mother rest elsewhere, and son or daughter desire to recognize
them, let them prick themselves so that blood will drop on the bones; if they
are related by blood, it will penetrate the bones; if it happens they are not
related by blood, the named result will not follow." More proximate is the
legal recognition by Chinese and Japanese authority of the propriety, as proof
of descent, of mixing the blood of litigants in a bowl to observe coagulation
phenomena !

12

HARGRAVE, COLL. JUR.

(1769)

402.

3 WHEELER, CR. C. (N. Y. 1808) 194.
S12 How. ST. TR. 1199; see also (1926) 40 A. L. R. 99, 136.
'63 Utah 171, 224 Pac. 442 (1924).
263, 264.
SHULL, HEREDITY (1931)
(1932) 60 MEDICAL TImES 203 et seq.: Symposium on. the Forensic
Value of Tests for Blood Grouping. In the discussion, Judge Steinbrink said
in part: "There can be no doubt but that injustice does frequently creep in,
especially in cases of disputed paternity handled in the Corporation Counsel's
office, where the.machinery for detecting the truth is somewhat limited. Likewise the machinery of our courts is not yet so well or properly oiled to attain
the exact truth and exact justice in each case. Since we cannot measure out
justice on a scale, we must adopt the next best means."
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tics available, that the minority 'suffers for the good of the majority.
It is desirable as a matter of sound public policy that there be a restraint placed upon the production of bastards; but a substantial incidence of unsound determinations exists as a result of excluding
competent, material and relevant evidence. 39
Bastardy proceedings are considered civil in nature in many
jurisdictions. New York assumes the position that such actions are
quasi-criminal. The fathering of a bastard, per se, does not constitute a specific crime at common law; under the statutory law, the
failure to support such progeny, foisting it upon the commonwealth
as an actual or semi-public charge, seems to make out the criminal
element. 40 The determination of paternity relates clearly to the civil
phase of the action and should be governed by the civil rules of procedure; or, if the quasi-criminal flavor permeates the entire substance
of the action, civil rules should temper the character of the proceeding. In Taylor v. Diamond,41 the Appellate Division said, however,
that the Court of Special Sessions, in the absence of statutory authority,42 has no power to order the drawing of blood for non-paternity
tests in advance of trial in bastardy proceedings. This holding seems
inconsistent with the logic of the situation. Particularly is this true
and to be deprecated in view
of the arbitrary standard and difficulty
43
of proof in such actions.
In view of the quasi-civil, as well as quasi-criminal, nature of
bastardy proceedings in New York, precedent for submitting the
plaintiff to physical examination exists at common law in early, lower
court decisions; certainly, such holdings may be brought into relation with actions for civil assault. 44 The trend in New York seemed
favorable to permitting examinations in personal civil actions until
the decision of McQuigan v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western
R. R. Co. 4 5 which followed Roberts v. Ogdensburg R. R. Co.4 6

In

the former case, a unanimous Court of Appeals held that examination
of the plaintiff before trial on application of the defendant in a civil
action is not permissible in the absence of statutory authority; the
Supreme Court has no power derivable from the common law to
order such examination. Judge Andrews leans heavily upon the
decision in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford.4 7 If the latter case
is unsound, then it follows that the McQuigan case is an unsound
Supra notes 13, 14, 18 and 24.

People v. Snell, 216 N. Y. 527, 111 N. E. 50 (1916).

details see

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

For procedural

§§838-860.

241 App. Div. 702, 269 N. Y. Supp. 799 (2d Dept. 1934).
, Referring to INFERIOR CRIMINAL CouRTs ACT, art. V, §70.
43
Supra note 20.
4'

"Supra notes 30 and 35.
129 N. Y. 50, 29 N. E. 235 (1891).
29 Hun 154 (General Term, 3d Dept. 1883), which held the sacredness

of the person a bar to examination at request of the defendant.
'

Supra note 31.
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reversal of lower court decisions. Mr. Justice Sutherland has said : 48
"A wrong decision does not end with itself; it is a precedent, and,
with the swing of sentiment, its bad influence may run from one
extremity of the arc to the other."
Mr. Justice Gray, in the Botsford case, bases his views on denying the 49
right to examination in advance of trial on the theory of
trespass.
"The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a
compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel
anyone, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault and a trespass; and no order
or process, commanding such an exposure or submission, was
ever known to the common law in the administration of justice between individuals, except in a very small number of
cases, based upon special reasons, and upon ancient practice,
coming down from ruder ages,50 now mostly obsolete in England, and never, so far as we are aware, introduced into this
country."
On close examination and analysis, it may be said with confidence that the opinion of Mr. Justice Gray is the expression of an
outraged sense of decency rather than a pronouncement of justice.
It is unsound and unjust 51 in application to negligence actions as
time has shown; but, in the words of Mr. Justice Sutherland, "its
bad influence has run from one extremity of the arc to the other"
and today plagues us and obfuscates the administration of justice in
civil assault and bastardy proceedings in this jurisdiction when determination of paternity is an issue before the court.
The learned justice proceeds from premises of modesty and
makes a scoffing sham of justice thereby. 52 Surely, the basis of his
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
"' Supra note 31.
o Custom in such ruder ages was to the contrary. The existing morality,
or suspicion, enjoined the physician or barber-surgeon from examining and
treating women unless under the most careful observation of relatives of the
patient. Midwives attended women in labor. GARRIsoN, HisToRY OF MEDICINE
(1917) 155, 225.
Two justices dissented. Mr. Justice Brewer, supra note 31, wrote in
part: "It is said that there is a sanctity of the person which may not be
outraged. We believe that truth and justice arc more sacred than any personal
consideration; and if in other cases in the interests of justice, or from other
considerations of mercy, the courts may, as they often do, require such personal
examination, why should they not exercise the same power in cases like this, to
prevent wrong and injustice?"
' Interwoven with the "indignity," "compulsory stripping and exposure,"
"to compel anyone, and especially a woman to lay bare the body" is the mock
modesty with which civilization has shrouded sex. A sense of delicate social
proportion and personal dignity in matters sexual is one of the nobler aspects
'
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logic in admitting that inspection of the female person in divorce
actions, as authorized by "the interest which the public, as well as
the parties, have in the question of upholding or dissolving the
marriage state," should apply equally well to bastardy proceedings by
analogy. Surely, if "to protect the rightful succession to the property
of a deceased person against fraudulent claims of bastards, when a
widow was suspected to feign herself with child in order to produce
a supposititious heir to the estate" an examination and restraint of the
person was permissible, avoidance of injury to property was the basis
of reason that moved the common law judiciary to set aside the sacred
and inviolable rights of the person. 53 It requires no American precedent to realize that injury to property, whether real or personal, resulting proximately from failure to submit proper parties to skilled
examination is unjust and arbitrary. Both the Botsford and McQuigan
cases are unsound but overruled earlier common law holdings, the
affirmance of which would have made legislative action, resulting in
Section 306 of the Civil Practice Act,54 unnecessary.

Similarly, the suggestion that it is an unwarranted trespass to
subject the child involved in a particular bastardy or civil action to
the drawing of blood, is angling beyond depth for an eel that will
wriggle. By comparison, the continued trespass, sanctioned by law,
upon the unfortunate defendant's property, liberty or both, in wrongly
adjudged cases, seems an enormity quite in keeping with Mr. Justice
Gray's "indignity, an assault and a trespass." If the child has any
claims to support from the putative father, it seems reasonable and
of man or woman. The learned justice may have had in mind such refinement
of character and imputed it to the situation at bar. But the plain intendment
of his words opens the avenue to the exploitation of sinister concealment, false
modesty or both. False modesty, more often than not, is evidence of latent
pruriency and viciousness. Such questionable virtue should not obstruct justice.
The restriction with reference to examining female litigants is reflected in
Civil Practice Act §306. See CALVERTON & SCHMALHAUSEN, SEX IN CIVILIZATION (1929) 605, 606.
t' This is in harmony with the early views of precedent rights of property
over those of personality, which actually existed in ruder ages and attended
the infancy of common law. The evolution of the right of privacy in equity,
and as expressed in the CIvn. RIGHTs LAW §§50, 51, refers to reasonable and
justifiable limitations on the infringement of the individual's existence. Mr.
Justice Gray's limitations on the right of privacy are neither reasonable nor
justifiable. It shocks the intellect to realize that feminine modesty is superior
to personal property interests, but subordinate to public policy and the right
to succession to real property.
&'The section reads: "In an action to recover damages for personal injuries,
if the defendant shall present to the court satisfactory evidence that he is
ignorant of the nature and extent of the injuries complained of, the court, by
order, shall direct that the plaintiff submit to a physical examination by one or
more physicians or surgeons to be designated by the court or judge, and such
examination shall be had and made under such restrictions and direction as to
the court or judge shall seem proper. If the party to be examined shall be a
female she shall be entitled to have such examination before a physician or
surgeon of her own sex. The order for such physical examination, upon the
application of the defendant, may also direct that the testimony of such party
be taken by deposition pursuant to this article."
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equitable that it be subjected to a harmless and justifiable trespass
in ascertaining the extent of the alleged father's liability when the
court has all parties before it. 55 This is all the more proper when
viewed in the light of law 56 which subjects the parent to criminal
liability in event of not permitting or procuring more extensive trespasses to the person of the child for the purpose of healing disease.
In civil assault actions involving the determination of paternity,
the liberal application of the rule laid down in Hayt v. Brewster,
Gordon & Co., 57 which permits the drawing of blood in connection
with physical examination before trial under Civil Practice Act, Section 306, is indicated. The quasi-civil nature of bastardy proceedings
should permit the adoption of a similar rule; or else the statute governing bastardy proceedings should be amended.
The weight of common law authority, permitting the exhibition
of infants and children to the jury to establish resemblance is properly and reasonably not recognized in New York as a general proposition; 58 such exhibitions are prejudicial without serving an adequate
purpose, except in special instances. But, startlingly enough, the
legal insistence upon the defect of non-paternity tests as a negative
consideration raises a subtle point. If the test were positive in form,
establishing paternity, it would seem logical that a sound legal argument against admission of such evidence as coming under the rule of
exhibition of similarities, not obvious to the jury, might be sustained.
A clear distinction, however, exists between offering such evidence,
and the presentation of a scientific criterion of dissimilarity. The
complaining witness or plaintiff, as the case may be, and her child
are in possession 59 of material and relevant evidence demonstrable
Y'The Appellate Division, mpra note 6, said: "This child is not a party to
this action, and while a court of chancery has an inherent jurisdiction over the
welfare of an infant, a ward of the court, nothing in this case indicates that
the welfare of this infant is in any wise involved or that the blood test could
possibly be beneficial. Section 306 of the Civil Practice Act has no application
to the facts of this case."
See also People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 68
' PENAL CODE §§288, 289.
N. E. 243 (1903).
' 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dept. 1921) where Judge
Hubbs said: "The Legislature, in enacting said statute and thereby changing
the common-law rule, must have intended that it should be of some practical
assistance in the discovery of the truth. * * * There is no doubt about the
reason for such enactment. Its purpose was to afford protection to defendants,
to enable them to discover the truth in regard to injuries claimed to have been
received by plaintiffs, and thereby to promote justice."
ln re Turnbull, 4 N. Y. Supp. 607 (1889); Bilkovic v. Loeb, 156 App.
Div. 719, 141 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dept. 1913); In re Wendel, 262 N. Y.
Supp. 41 (1933).
='"We must steadily bear in mind that, the inference of guilt to be drawn
from possession is never one of law. It is an inference of fact." People v.
Galbo, 218 N. Y. 283, 112 N. E. 1041 (1916). The established incidence of
fraudulent or perjured claims by plaintiffs in bastardy and civil assault cases
should make clear the necessity of an inference of guilt where the plaintiff
refuses to submit herself or her child to non-paternity tests. Public policy
demands that the economic ruin of innocent defendants be cured; blackmail by
threat or duress in such cases is none too rare.

NOTES AND COMMENT
by recognized tests. The evidence constitutes an important factual
question and not a matter of law. It is as though a material fact is
suppressed, when subtleties and procedural niceties of questionable
authenticity in common law origins and existing statutory privileges,
prevent the admission of non-paternity tests as evidence. Strange,
and in a sense incomprehensible, it is that a jurisdiction which liberally sanctions trespass and admits evidence in criminal cases 60 obtained by methods condemned by the United States Supreme Court, 61
should be ultra-technical in civil assault and bastardy proceedings, and
subject the defendant to an arbitrary standard of proof, the rigorous
and stringent rules of both criminal and civil actions, and permit the
merciful immunities and privileges of neither. In excluding evidence
of non-paternity tests, directly or by indirection as a procedural matter, a grave injustice is'being done. Particularly is this so, since the
alleged necessity for legislative cure is an admission of existing error.
The test does not seek to establish guilt; it looks toward the possible
discovery of innocence. Especially in criminal or quasi-criminal cases
this should favor admission as evidence, in accord with the so-called
advantage or presumption of innocence which common law principles
established. As such, it is some evidence, and should properly be
admitted as relevant to the issue.
The question of expert testimony arises in the interpretation of
non-paternity tests. Such tests are capable of demonstration in the
courtroom, if necessary; they may be performed by experts for either
side, by state experts, or all in collaboration. The court may hear
the testimony of any or all such witnesses. There is no confusion
of concepts on this subject; it would offer one of the few instances
in medicine where the interpretation of a test follows with mathematical preciseness from factual premises. Under proper circumstances, 62 such evidence should be of some value in the majority of
civil assault and bastardy cases in which paternity is an issue.
There is a prevalent notion that courts exist to dispense "natural
justice." 63 The adoption of such an irregular and unsystematic code
People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926) ; see also People
v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003 (1894).
' Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup.
Ct. 182 (1920); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420
(1932).
' "The hired expert, simply because he is hired, lays himself open to the
suspicion of bias. Not infrequently this suspicion appears to be well founded.
The contentious method of presenting expert testimony has bred a type of
expert whose opinion appears to be purchasable. * * * The expert witness may

have a firm and honest opinion and may be thoroughly honest and impartial in
presenting it. But what Maguire has called 'the ignorance, haggling and

artificial restrictions with which lawyers and some judges alike sometimes
confuse presentation of specialized information' may place the honest expert
in such a position that he is 'forced to contend for the correctness of his
opinion. Having been forced into a combative and contentious attitude, he
loses his value as an impartial expert." Schultz, supra note 3, at 555, 556.
' "I have received many letters from people who seem to suppose that I
have a general discretion to see that justice is done. They are written with the

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
would strike at the very roots of Anglo-Saxon common law. However, when new phases of knowledge are established, the law should
respond to the internal pressure of the thing it seeks to control. It
is possible, and even probable, that in the Beuschel and Taylor cases,
the non-paternity tests would have been of no conclusive value; but
this carries no weight as to the general materiality, relevancy and
competency of such evidence. The writer respectfully submits that
the Appellate Division, perhaps bound by the tradition and custom
of an intermediate appellate tribunal, erred in the sweeping generalization of its reversal. There is urgent necessity for the Court of
Appeals to pass on the matter under discussion; it is to be hoped
that an early opportunity arises for the progressive and enlightened
court as it*exists today to consider the question. Should the Court
of Appeals find it impossible to reconcile the situation with adverse
but unsound precedents, it might be urged that the finest ingots of
common law justice are poured from the crucible in which form and
fact 64 are melted indissolubly into the substance that constitutes law.
If, then, the ruling is adverse to the admission of non-paternity tests
in evidence, the remedy lies with the legislature. The established
phenomena of the heredity of blood groups, their interpretation and
application, as recognized in many civilized nations today, should be
made available to the state and to litigants before its courts in
criminal 05 and civil cases.
EmIL F. KoCH.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS-DEFINITIONS AND HISTORY-PURPOSEBENEFICIARIES-CY PRES DOCTRINE.

What is a charitable trust? The term is synonymous with the
terms public trust and charity.' The definition formulated in a
Massachusetts case has been extensively quoted:
"A charity in the legal sense may be more fully defined
as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for
the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringconfidence that sometimes goes with ignorance of the law."
Holmes, it re Sacco and Vanzetti, N. Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1927;
CAsEs ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1927)

511.

Mr. Justice
FINKELSTEIN,

Cardozo, supra note 23, at 5: "Form is not something added to substance
as a mere protuberant adornment. The two are fused into a unity." It may
be said that form without substance is a mere and ugly protuberance in the
legal scheme of things.
(1932) 3 AMERICAN JR. OF POLICE SCIENCE 157 discusses the application
of blood groups in forensic medicine; see also (1932) 87 N. Y. L. J. 810.
64
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